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The target zone model by Krugman (1991) assumes that foreign exchange intervention 
targets exchange rate levels. We argue that the fit of this model depends on the stage of 
development of capital markets. Foreign exchange intervention of countries with highly 
developed capital markets is in line with Krugman’s (1991) model as the exchange rate 
level is targeted (mostly to sustain the competitiveness of exports) and the volatility of 
day-to-day exchange rate changes are left to market forces. In contrast, countries with 
underdeveloped capital markets control both volatility of day-to-day exchange rate 
changes as well as long-term fluctuations of the exchange rate levels to sustain the 
competitiveness of exports as well as to reduce the risk for short-term and long-term 
payment flows. Estimations of foreign exchange intervention reaction functions for Ja-
pan and Croatia trace the asymmetric pattern of foreign exchange intervention in coun-
tries with developed and underdeveloped capital markets. 
 
 
Keywords: Foreign exchange intervention, target zones, underdeveloped capital mar-
kets, reactions functions.  
 
JEL classification:  F31  
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Since the so-called Jurgensen report a large and still growing literature has scrutinized 
the motivation and effects of sterilized foreign exchange intervention in Germany, Ja-
pan and the US, i.e. in large countries issuing international currencies. This research on 
foreign exchange intervention has been traditionally based on the institutional setting of 
independent monetary policy making, freely floating exchange rates, full capital mobil-
ity and the international use of the respective currencies.  
 
Recently, as some emerging markets have released data on their intervention activities, 
a new branch of literature on foreign exchange intervention in emerging markets has 
emerged. While this literature has partially acknowledged the different institutional set-
ting of foreign exchange intervention—i.e. fragmented capital markets, an internation-
ally and domestically restricted role of the respective currencies and (therefore) (partly) 
unsterilized intervention—the different patterns of foreign exchange intervention in 
small countries with underdeveloped capital markets in comparison to large countries 
with highly developed capital markets has not been systematically explored so far.  
 
In contrast to most former papers on foreign exchange intervention, which have mainly 
scrutinized the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention and have treated reaction 
functions as a (subordinated) part of this research, we focus on the motivations for for-
eign exchange intervention. We draw a distinction between the pattern of foreign ex-
change intervention in large countries with highly developed capital markets and the 
intervention pattern in emerging markets with underdeveloped capital markets.  
 
To trace the (different) motivations for foreign exchange intervention Japan is taken as a 
case study of a country with highly developed capital markets. In line with the Krugman 
(1991) target zone model, Japan is expected to mainly target the exchange rate level (to 
sustain the competitiveness of the export industry and to avoid revaluation losses of 
international dollar assets). Croatia represents the small countries with underdeveloped 
capital markets. It is expected to target both the exchange level (to sustain the competi-
tiveness of exports in times of appreciation and to sustain financial stability in times of 
depreciation) and day-to-day exchange rate volatility (to reduce the risk for short-term 
payment flows).   
Binary probit and tobit estimations of reaction functions trace the different intervention 
patterns for Japan and Croatia econometrically. The results for Croatia widely confirm 
the notion that emerging markets with underdeveloped capital markets tend to heavily 
manage both day-to-day exchange rate volatilities as well as exchange rate levels. The 
pattern of foreign exchange intervention for Croatia confirms a fear of depreciation 
(with respect to balance sheet effects of the banking sector) more than a fear of appre-
ciation (with respect to export competitiveness). 
 
The results for Japan are less robust. The asymmetric intervention pattern clearly con-
firms a fear of a high yen which can be attributed to concerns about the competitiveness 
of the export industry as well valuations losses of international dollar reserves. There is 
less econometric evidence that also exchange rate volatility matters. As exchange rate 
volatility has been consistently higher in Japan than in Croatia, the Japanese monetary 
authorities do not seem concerned about day-to-day volatility which is in line the highly 
developed capital markets which provide sufficient instruments to hedge short-term 










Since the so-called Jurgensen report (Jurgensen 1983) a large and still growing litera-
ture has scrutinized the motivation and effects of sterilized foreign exchange interven-
tion in Germany, Japan and the US, i.e. in large countries issuing international curren-
cies (e.g. Dominguez and Frankel 1993, Bonser-Neal and Tanner 1996, Dominguez 
1998, Beine, Laurent and Lecourt 2003). This research on foreign exchange interven-
tion has been traditionally based on the institutional setting of independent monetary 
policy making, freely floating exchange rates, full capital mobility and the international 
use of the respective currencies. Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Neely (2005) give over-
views.  
 
Recently, as some emerging markets—namely Croatia, Turkey, the Czech Republic and 
Mexico—have (partially) released data on their intervention activities, a number of pa-
pers focusing on foreign exchange intervention in emerging markets has emerged (e.g. 
Domaç and Mendoza 2002, Lang 2005, Égert and Komárek 2005, Akinci et al. 2005). 
While this new branch of literature has partially acknowledged the different institutional 
setting of foreign exchange intervention—i.e. fragmented capital markets, an interna-
tionally and domestically restricted role of the respective currencies and (therefore) 
(partly) unsterilized intervention—the different patterns of foreign exchange interven-
tion in emerging markets in comparison to large countries with highly developed capital 
markets has not been systematically explored so far.  
 
In contrast to most former papers on foreign exchange intervention, which have mainly 
scrutinized the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention and have treated reaction 
functions as a (subordinated) part of this research, we focus on the motivations for for-
eign exchange intervention. We draw a distinction between the pattern of foreign ex-
change intervention in large countries with highly developed capital markets and in 
emerging markets with underdeveloped capital markets. Econometric estimations of 
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McKinnon and Schnabl (2004a, 2004b) stress the asymmetric nature of the world cur-
rency system. While the United States as the issuer of the most important international 
currency pursue an independent monetary policy focused on domestic inflation and 
growth, most countries outside of Europe tend to stabilize their exchange rates against 
the dollar due to a high degree of openness and underdeveloped capital markets. A simi-
lar situation applies to the euro area and its periphery. The European Central Bank is 
independent in monetary policy making (from exchange rate considerations), while in 
most European non-euro area countries the euro is widely used as a banking, vehicle, 
invoicing, intervention, reserve, and pegging currency (ECB 2005).  
2.1. Countries with Highly Developed Capital Markets 
 
The intervention pattern of the large countries with highly developed capital markets is 
mainly in line with the target zone model of foreign exchange intervention as put for-
ward by Williamson and Miller (1987) and Krugman (1991). Within this framework, 
the exchange rate level is defended within a certain bandwidth around a central parity 
between two currencies, for instance ±10% as proposed by Williamson and Miller 
(1987). The participating central banks implement their monetary policies independ-
ently from the exchange rate target as long as the exchange rate fluctuates within the 
respective target zone.  
 
Intervention becomes necessary once the exchange rate approaches the margins in the 
case of strong appreciation (which hurts the competitiveness of exports) or strong de-
preciation (which might be considered as a threat to domestic price stability). In a wider 
interpretation – without having established a specific target zone – intervention would 
occur, when the exchange approaches a level which is regarded as inappropriate by the 
monetary authorities.  
 
In the case of such a broad band
1 or informal limits to exchange rate swings consider-
able exchange rate flexibility would be allowed and foreign exchange intervention 
would be “only occasional rather than a continuous preoccupation” (Krugman 1991: 
                                                 
1   A very tight band would be equivalent to a tightly managed float or a hard peg, although the border 
lines between a hard peg and a target zone are fluent. 
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669). Following Krugman (1991) the target zone for the exchange rate s can be modeled 
as a function of the domestic money supply m, a shift term representing velocity shocks 
v and expected exchange rate changes E(ds)/dt with positive values representing depre-
ciation. The coefficient γ represents the impact of expectations on the exchange rate. All 





v m s γ + + =           ( 1 )  
 
In equation (1) the monetary policy is “independent” as long as the exchange rate is 
moving within the target zones s  and  s −   around a central parity s *. Exogenous 
shocks to the exchange rate are modeled by the velocity term v which is assumed to 
follow a random walk and which may push the exchange rate towards the margins. The 
stance in monetary policy is only changed to maintain the limits. This version of the 
target zone model is shown in the left panel of Figure 1. Changes in the monetary policy 
stance, for instance in form of unsterilized foreign exchange intervention, will keep the 
nominal exchange rate within the margins s  and  s − .  
 
While Williamson and Miller (1987) had fully excluded the exchange rate behavior 
within the margin from their analysis, Krugman (1991) modeled the exchange rate be-
havior within the band incorporating exchange rate expectations. As market participants 
are anticipating that the monetary authority will intervene at the upper or lower margins, 
this implies an s-shaped exchange rate behavior as shown in the right panel of Figure 1. 
In both cases the exchange rate level is clearly the target of (unsterilized) intervention 
activity. To “guide” expectations also intra-marginal interventions like they have been 
used in the European Exchange Rate System I may take place. 
 
The target zone model as described above fits well the intervention behavior of large 
countries with deep capital markets issuing international currencies. The target zones as 
(temporarily) established among the currencies of the US, Japan and Germany by the 
1987 Louvre Accord (Funabashi 1989) was in line with the Williamson-Miller proposi-
tion, although the targets—and in specific a central parity—were not officially an-
nounced. Similarly, during the 1990s and 2000s, the European Central Bank and the 
9
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Federal Reserve intervened in foreign exchange markets (very occasionally) when the 
exchange rate level had reached “extreme” limits—although intervention was sterilized. 
 
The (very active) foreign exchange intervention by the Japanese monetary authorities can 
be argued to have followed a similar pattern because intervention was triggered once the 
exchange rate had reached (varying) levels of the yen against the dollar which the mone-
tary authorities regarded as detrimental for the competitiveness of the Japanese export 
industry (Hillebrand and Schnabl 2006, McKinnon and Ohno 1997). The intervention 
pattern is reflected in clusters of intervention activity when the yen was very strong
2 and 
extended periods of non-intervention when the yen was weaker (Figure 2). In contrast to 
the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, the Bank of Japan has also allowed 
for unsterilized intervention since 1999. While the Japanese yen was prevented from ris-
ing above a certain level against the dollar, the day-to-day exchange rate volatility against 
the dollar remained high similar to the euro/dollar exchange rate (Figure 3).  
 
2.2. Countries with Underdeveloped Capital Markets 
 
McKinnon and Schnabl (2004a) provide the rationale for exchange rate stabilization in 
small open economies with underdeveloped capital markets. They argue that emerging 
markets and developing countries cannot choose their monetary framework exoge-
nously based on specific targets of economic policy making. Rather, the regime choice 
is interpreted as endogenous, determined by several inherent and interdependent factors 
such as macroeconomic stabilization, (invoicing of) international trade, and (the cur-
rency denomination of) international capital flows. 
 
While international trade and macroeconomic stability constitute important determi-
nants for exchange rate stabilization, we focus on underdeveloped capital markets as 
they are prevalent in emerging markets and development countries (Eichengreen and 
Hausmann 1999). Due to a long tradition of inflation and depreciation, which have par-
tially resulted in a high degree of dollarization or euroization of the respective econo-
                                                 
2    In some cases the financial press believed to have identified informal target zones—for instance be-
tween 115 and 122 yen per dollar in the first seven months of 2003 (Deutsche Bank Global Investment 
Committee June 16 2003 and Financial Times August 7 2003).  
mies
3, banks and enterprises can not use the domestic currency to borrow or to lend in-
ternationally. As international investors and debtors are unwilling to accept liabilities 
and assets denominated in local currencies, the aggregated foreign exchange risk of net 
international debt and assets remains widely unhedged.  
 
If hedging instruments are available, they are very costly due to the low degree of liquid-
ity of the foreign exchange markets. Thus, from a short-term perspective, day-to-day ex-
change rate volatilities constitute a risk for short-term payments flows. In contrast, in Ja-
pan, the euro area and the US highly developed capital markets provide a broad variety of 
cheap instruments to hedge the foreign exchange risk of short-term payments flows.  
 
From a more long-term perspective, fluctuations in the exchange rate level constitute a 
risk for the competitiveness of export industries and balance sheets of banks and enter-
prises. In the case of liability dollarization, sharp depreciations inflate the liabilities in 
terms of domestic currency increasing the probability of default and crisis.
4 In highly 
euroized (dollarized) countries with a high stock of foreign currency deposits and bor-
rowing such as Croatia, the incentive to avoid sharp exchange rate fluctuations is even 
stronger. In contrast, in large countries which hold international debt and assets in do-
mestic currencies, exchange rate fluctuations leave the balance sheets of domestic banks 
and enterprises unaffected. 
 
The outcome for emerging markets and developments countries is exchange rate stabiliza-
tion targeting day-to-day exchange rate volatility as shown by McKinnon and Schnabl 
(2004a) for East Asia and by Schnabl (2004) for Central and Eastern Europe. For Croatia, 
Lang (2005: 9-10) argues that the Croatian National Bank is (mostly) leaning against higher 
exchange rate volatility defined as percent exchange rate changes. Similarly in 2005, the 
Central Bank of Russia has announced to stabilize daily exchange rate volatilities against 
the dollar and the euro (Schnabl 2006). In July 2005, China announced limits to day-to-day 
exchange rate fluctuations of the yuan against the dollar, the euro and other currencies.  
 
                                                 
3   For instance, most South Eastern European countries, in specific the former Yugoslav countries, are 
highly euroized.  
4   In the case of international creditor countries such as China, Russia or Taiwan the appreciation of the 
domestic currency constitutes a threat to domestic balances sheets (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004b). 
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Modifying equation (1) to the respective intervention pattern of countries with underde-





v m s γ + + = ∆  (2) 
 
∆s corresponds to percent exchange rate changes which are subject to the official inter-
vention activity. The central banks conduct (unsterilized) foreign exchange intervention 
to keep day-to-day exchange rate volatility at certain levels. The respective exchange 
rate policy is modeled in Figure 4. As for the target zones of exchange rate levels the 
bands widths can differ, i.e. being very tight for hard pegs and allowing for more day-
to-day exchange rate volatility in the case of soft pegs or managed float arrangements. 
As in the case of the original target zone models the band width can be officially an-
nounced as in the case of China or being undisclosed as for many other East Asian cur-
rencies. The target zones on day-to-day exchange rate fluctuations can be also an-
nounced for a basket of currencies, as recently in Russia, with specific weights attrib-
uted to the basket components (Schnabl 2006). In contrast to the target zone model 
based on equation (1), no central parity for the exchange rate fluctuations would be an-
nounced as exchange rate returns naturally oscillate around zero.  
 
The outcome for the exchange rate behavior is shown for Croatia and Taiwan in Figure 
3. Although the foreign exchange markets of emerging markets can be assumed to be 
shallower and therefore more volatile than the dollar/euro market, exchange rate volatil-
ity is significantly lower than for the freely floating dollar/euro rate. As suggested by 
Figure 3 smoothing daily exchange rate volatility also implies a smoothing of the ex-
change rate level. In both Croatia and Taiwan, (periods of) low daily exchange rate 
volatility is associated with lower volatility of the exchange rate level.  
 
The upshot is that smoothing exchange rate volatility on a day-to-day basis is used as an 
intermediate target for smoothing the exchange rate level. If the euro/dollar rate can be 
characterized as a random walk, managed exchange rates as the kuna/euro rate would be 
equivalent to a “managed walk”. As daily movements are reduced also fluctuations of 
the exchange rate level are less. Within this setting, various targets for the exchange rate 
level are possible. The monetary authorities can smooth depreciations and appreciations  
13
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of the exchange rate around a certain level as suggested by Taiwan and Croatia in 
Figure 3. The currency can be tightly pegged to the anchor currency as currently in the 
Baltics or a downward crawling peg with very small day-to-day fluctuations as in Slo-
venia before its ERM II entry can be allowed. In Russia since 2005, the management of 
day-to-day exchange rate volatilities against two currencies also implies the stabiliza-




3. Data and Specification of the Reaction Function 
 
Based on the analysis of section 2 we would expect the following intervention pattern in 
countries with different degrees of capital market development: In line with Krugman 
(1991) large countries issuing international currencies with highly developed capital mar-
kets may decide to stabilize exchange rate levels, but leave day-to-day exchange rate 
volatility to market forces. Emerging markets with underdeveloped capital markets tend 
to stabilize both day-to-day exchange rate fluctuations as well as exchange rate levels.  
 
To test for different intervention behaviour we estimate foreign exchange intervention 
reaction functions for Japan and Croatia. The two countries are chosen for the following 
reasons: Japan is attributed to the group of large countries with highly developed capital 
markets issuing an international currency as the (yen) capital markets are among the 
three largest in the world. In addition, the Japanese yen is, beside the US dollar and the 
euro, the third largest international currency. Among the countries with the largest capi-
tal markets, i.e. US, euro area, Japan, and UK, only Japan and the US have released data 
on their intervention activities. As foreign exchange interventions tend to be very rare in 
the US (the last intervention took place in 1998) only Japan (where intervention has 
been traditionally very active) provides an appropriate case study.
6 
 
Croatia is attributed to the group of emerging market economies with underdeveloped 
capital markets, as the size of Croatian capital markets is small, maturities tend to be 
short and domestic borrowing and lending is highly “euroized”. In addition foreign debt 
tends to be denominated in foreign currency, mostly euros. In contrast to (the small 
                                                 
5   This does not exclude that other targets such as lower inflation interfere with the exchange rate target. 
6   For a more extensive analysis of Japanese foreign exchange intervention since the early 1990s see Ito 
(2003) and Hillebrand and Schnabl (2006).  
number of) other emerging markets which have released data on their intervention ac-
tivities, the data are publicly available and provided for a long time period (more than 




The descriptive statistics (Table 1) give an overview. Daily data on Japanese foreign 
exchange intervention are provided by the Japanese Ministry of Finance starting in 
April 1, 1991.
7 The amounts are in trillion yen subdivided into purchases and sales of 
dollar, mark (euro) and other (negligible) currencies. Since the yen/dollar exchange rate 
is the dominant target for Japanese foreign exchange intervention, only dollar transac-
tions are included in our sample. The yen amounts are converted into billion dollars 
based on daily exchange rates. On 3652 trading days the Ministry of Finance reports 
337 dollar intervention days—306 dollars purchases and 31 dollar sales—exhibiting a 
strong asymmetric intervention pattern in favor of dollar purchases.  
 
Croatia has provided data on its intervention activities starting from January 1996. Dur-
ing this observation period the Croatian National Bank purchased foreign currency on 
103 trading days and sold foreign currency on 88 trading days. The total volume of for-
eign exchange purchases is equivalent to 24.77 million kunas, the volume of foreign 
exchange sales was 20.35 million of kunas. Thus, the intervention activity is distributed 
more symmetrically than in Japan. As since 1996 Croatian foreign exchange interven-
tion has been predominantly denominated in euros, only euro transactions are included 
in the sample.  
 
Table 1 shows that – other than expected – the unconditional probability of foreign ex-
change intervention is similar in Croatia and Japan. Between January 1996 and March 
2005 the Croatian National Bank, which has kept the exchange rate rather tightly 
pegged to the euro (formerly to the DM), intervened on about 8% of trading days. In 
contrast the Bank of Japan, which has left the exchange rate of the Japanese yen more to 
market forces (as shown by higher daily exchange rate volatility), has intervened on 
about 9% of trading days between January 1991 and March 2005.  
                                                 
7   The exact intervention time, the number of interventions within a day, the intervention market (Tokyo, 
London, New York), and the exchange rate at the time of intervention remain undisclosed. 
14
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The unconditional intervention probability of Croatia is likely to be downward biased in 
comparison to Japan for the following reasons: Small and underdeveloped capital mar-
kets allow a broad variety of informal measures other than outright intervention to con-
trol the exchange rate. Although Croatia—in contrast to most other emerging markets—
has been very transparent with respect to its intervention activities, the data on foreign 
exchange intervention—defined as foreign exchange transactions by the monetary poli-
cies to influence exchange rates—do not provide the full picture on interventions activ-
ity for mainly three reasons.  
 
First, in emerging markets and development countries indirect measures to affect ex-
change rate changes are numerous (Neely 2001) and include “disguised intervention” 
through undisclosed foreign exchange accounts, foreign exchange transaction of the 
government with the central bank as well as all kinds of capital and foreign exchange 
controls which prevent (temporarily) exchange rate pressure from emerging.
8 Second, 
credible signalling of the central bank to keep the exchange rate at a certain level may 
encourage stabilizing private market speculation towards the explicit or implicit official 
exchange rate targets.
9 Third, central banks in emerging markets may maintain a close 
relationship with commercial banks to control transactions in the foreign exchange mar-
kets without outright intervention.
10 In contrast, the main tool for the Japanese central 
bank to steer the yen exchange rate in deep markets with a large number of participants 
are outright foreign exchange transactions. 
 
                                                 
8   As stressed by Lang (2005: 3-4) for Croatia the published data on foreign exchange intervention do 
not cover foreign exchange transactions between the central bank and the government which consid-
erably affect the exchange rate. The Croatian finance ministry may hold privatization receipts and 
revenues from issuing euro bonds on its account at the CNB. During 2000 to 2004, between 12% and 
99% of foreign exchange sales and purchases were defined as foreign exchange interventions. 
9   Killeen, Lyons and Moore (2001) provide an order flow model where the private sector (instead of the 
central bank) absorbs the exchange rate innovations given that the central bank has established a 
credible parity based on unsterilized intervention. 
10   Canales-Kriljenko (2003: 24) provides a survey of formal and informal administrative measures. 
These include surrender requirements to the central bank, prohibitions on interbank foreign exchange 
trading and “moral suasion”. Central banks may threaten repression to commercial banks which do 
not comply with informal guidance with respect to foreign exchange transactions. Such measures are 
facilitated by the fact that number of foreign exchange trading banks is normally small. 
15
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3.2. Model Specification 
 
In section 2, we have identified two main motivations for foreign exchange interven-
tion: (1) Smoothing day-to-day exchange rate volatility to reduce the exchange rate risk 
for short-term payment flows, (2) Softening long-term fluctuations of the exchange rate 
level to maintain the competitiveness of the domestic (export) industry in times of ap-
preciation and to protect the balance sheets of domestic firms and enterprises against 
depreciation.  
 
To test for the determinants of Croatian and Japanese foreign exchange intervention, we 
estimate binary probit and tobit reaction functions. The Croatian National Bank and 
Japanese monetary authorities may decide to intervene in foreign exchange markets if 
the kuna/euro (yen/dollar) exchange rate of the previous day ( 1 − t s ) departs from an ex-
change rate level, which is considered as adequate for both the competitiveness of ex-
ports (in case of appreciation) and financial stability (in case of depreciation). As a 
proxy for this level we use one year moving averages of the kuna/euro (yen/dollar) ex-







− − , where k = 253). The probability of intervention is assumed to 
increase the more the exchange rate level departs from its “target value”.
11  
 
Furthermore, the Croatian and Japanese monetary authorities may decide to buy or sell 
foreign exchange based on the relative exchange rate changes of the previous day  ) ( 1 − t r , 
i.e. exchange rate volatility. The higher the exchange rate changes, the higher the prob-
ability of intervention. Assuming that the monetary authorities intend to soften ex-
change rate fluctuations, kuna appreciation triggers foreign currency purchases (nega-
tive sign) and kuna depreciation triggers foreign currency sales (positive sign). Squared 
returns (
2
1) ( − t r )
12 are used as alternative measure for exchange rate volatility.  
 
                                                 
11  The probability of a foreign exchange sale will increase if the exchange rate level is above the tar-
geted level (positive sign of the α1 coefficient in equation 3). If the exchange rate level is below the 
targeted level, the probability of foreign exchange purchases increases (negative sign of the α1 coeffi-
cient in equation 3).  
12   Conditional volatilities compiled from GARCH yielded very contradictory results. 
16
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To control for capital inflows restrictions that might have an impact on the foreign ex-
change market in Croatia, we include a capital controls dummy (
D
t cc ) which is zero in 
the case of Japan. The Croatian National Bank introduced “Chilean-type” capital con-
trols from April 14, 1998 to October 14, 1998 to curtail surging short-term inflows. 
These controls did not last long as by fall 1998 (Russian crisis) foreign investors lost 
their interest in emerging markets. In October 1998 the Croatian capital controls could 
be removed. New capital controls were introduced in February 03, 2003 up to the pre-
sent (here March 31, 2005) when capital inflows accelerated again (Kraft and Jankov 
2005). In the case of capital (inflow) controls the probability of interventions is ex-













tt t i t t t
i
Is s k r c c αα α ε −− − −
=
=+ − + + + ∑  (3) 
 
4. Estimation Results 
 
Previous studies on foreign exchange intervention reaction function in emerging mar-
kets have come to very heterogeneous results concerning the motivations of foreign 
exchange intervention in emerging markets (Table 2). Lang (2005) finds exchange rate 
volatility to be the main driving force of Croatian foreign exchange intervention while 
the exchange rate level turns out to be insignificant. In contrast, Akinci et al. (2005) find 
both exchange rate volatility and exchange rate levels to be explanatory variables of 
Turkish foreign exchange intervention. The estimations of Guimarães and Karacadag 
(2004) for Mexico find the exchange rate level to be partially significant, while volatil-
ity is negatively significant. Estimations for reaction functions for Japan such as by Ito 
(2003) and Hillebrand and Schnabl (2006) have mainly found the exchange rate level to 
be the driving force of Japanese foreign exchange intervention. We want to shed more 
                                                 
13  Specifications with lagged interventions as explanatory variables led to very similar results. The re-
sults are not reported here as we could not provide rolling estimations on these models.  
light on this issue by estimations for Croatia and Japan based on the framework elabo-




Japan represents countries with highly developed capital markets. Table 3 presents the 
results for binary probit estimations for the whole estimation period and for a one period 
lag which yields the most significant results among estimations up to a lag length of 
four days. 
 
The absolute value of the deviation of the exchange rate from the moving average is 
highly significant and has the appropriate sign for aggregate interventions (right-hand 
side variables in absolute terms). The more the exchange rate deviates from the one year 
moving average, the higher is the probability of intervention. This finding is in line with 
the negative impact of yen appreciation on the Japanese export industry (McKinnon and 
Ohno 1997) and the negative revaluation effects in the case of yen appreciation on Ja-
pans’ tremendous international dollar reserves (McKinnon and Schnabl 2004b). The 
proxies for exchange rate volatility—yen/dollar returns and squared returns—remain 
widely insignificant. For dollar purchases both the exchange rate level and the exchange 
rate returns turn out highly significant with the appropriate negative sign (appreciation 
triggers dollar purchases). In contrast, all relevant coefficients for sales, which are only 
31 events, are insignificant.  
 
We also test for the joint significance based on likelihood ratios. Under the null hy-
pothesis that the restricted model is valid (α1 = α2 = 0), the test statistic has a limiting 
chi-squared distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions. 
The LR statistics with two degrees of freedom for the joint significance of the exchange 
rate level and exchange rate volatility for Japanese foreign exchange intervention are 
highly significant for aggregate interventions and purchases but not for sales. 
 
We perform several robustness tests. Two stage least squares estimations allow to use 
intervention volumes as endogenous variable with the respective sign (positive sign for 
foreign currency purchases and a negative sign for sales). It copes with possible en-
dogeneity bias by using the lagged deviations from the level and lagged returns as in-
18
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strumental variables. The results (Table 4) provide evidence that the deviation of the 
exchange rate from a certain level is triggering foreign exchange intervention. Exchange 
rate returns remain insignificant. In contrast to the binary probit estimations the devia-
tions of the exchange rate from the moving average turn out marginally significant also 
for dollar sales (certain specifications).  
 
Tobit estimation (Table 5) uses the (absolute) volumes of Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention as endogenous variable.
14 For aggregate interventions, the deviations from 
the moving average have the expected positive sign and are highly significant. Ex-
change rate volatility both in terms of returns and squared returns, has the expected 
positive sign and is significant but at lower levels than the deviation from the moving 
average. Purchase equation coefficients have the expected sign and are highly signifi-
cant for the exchange rate levels and returns (but not squared returns). The equation for 
sales can not be estimated due to outliers.
15  
 
Rolling probit reaction functions to test for structural changes in the size and significance 
levels for aggregate interventions and purchases do not yield robust results and are there-
fore not reported here. All in all, the reaction functions for Japanese foreign exchange 
intervention provide strong evidence that the exchange rate level is a determinant of Japa-




Croatia represents the group of emerging market economies with underdeveloped capi-
tal markets. Equation 3 is estimated for aggregate interventions (right-hand side vari-
ables in absolute terms), foreign currency purchases and foreign currency sales. The 
results of the binary probit specifications are shown in Table 6 for a one period lag 
which yields the most significant results among estimations up to a lag length of four 
days. Both exchange rate volatility and exchange rate levels seem to matter for interven-
tion. For aggregated interventions, the α1 coefficient representing the impact of the ex-
change rate level on foreign exchange intervention is highly significant. In addition, 
                                                 
14  The data are censored between zero and positive infinity. This implies that all endogenous variables 
enter with a positive sign.  
15   The intervention on 4/10/1998 implies negative likelihood. 
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exchange rate volatility matters. The α2 coefficient representing the impact of absolute 
exchange rate returns and squared returns is highly significant. 
 
Separating into purchases and sales of foreign currency yields an asymmetric outcome. 
For euro purchases which normally take place in times of kuna appreciation pressure, 
only exchange rate volatility (defined as percent changes) turns out to be significant. 
The exchange rate level seems not to affect official foreign currency purchases. In con-
trast, the α1 coefficient for foreign currency sales has the expected negative sign for the 
deviation from the average level (kuna appreciation triggers foreign currency purchases) 
and is highly significant. This may be attributed to the fact that the Croatian banking 
sector is highly exposed to foreign currency borrowing (Kraft and Jankov 2005). As the 
banking sector is vulnerable in the case of kuna depreciation more decisive intervention 
is triggered than in the face of appreciation. In the equation for foreign currency sales 
also the coefficients for exchange rate volatility turn out highly significant. 
 
As both exchange rate levels and exchange rate volatility seem to matter for Croatia we 
test for the joint significance of both variables based on likelihood ratios. The LR statis-
tics with two degrees of freedom for the joint significance of the exchange rate level and 
exchange rate volatility for Croatian foreign exchange intervention are highly signifi-
cant for most specifications (these statistics are not reported but can be provided upon 
request). The capital control dummy is negative and highly significant suggesting that 
since 2003 capital controls have successfully reduced the need for intervention.
16 
 
We perform several robustness tests. In two stage least squares estimations deviations 
from the exchange rate level coefficients have the expected signs for aggregate interven-
tions, purchases and sales and are all highly significant (Table 7). The Tobit estimations 
are widely in line with the standard probit reaction function (Table 8).  
 
We estimate rolling probit reaction functions to test for structural changes in the size 
and significance levels for aggregate interventions, purchases and sales. We report a 
                                                 
16  For the sake of brevity, we do not include the period from April 14, 1998 to October 14, 1998. The 
dummy is positive and highly significant in the probit and tobit models suggesting that the capital 
controls were not effective. This can be explained by the Russian crisis and by Croatia’s banking sec-
tor problems accompanied by a high current account deficit and exchange rate pressure.  
window size of 500 trading days (Figure 6).
17 For aggregate interventions the level of 
significance is rather volatile for both levels and volatility. Separating into purchases 
and sales, the coefficient indicating the impact of the exchange rate level of foreign cur-
rency purchases is highly volatile and mostly not significant. In contrast, exchange rate 
volatility defined as exchange rate returns has a significant impact on official currency 
purchases. For sales, exchange rate volatility clearly matters. The exchange rate level 
seems to have mattered around 1999, 2001 and from 2003 up to the present.  
 
Finally, rolling likelihood ratios (Figure 7) suggest that the deviations from the moving 
average and exchange rate returns are mostly jointly significant. When purchases and 
sales are analyzed separately, both deviations from the moving average and exchange 
rate returns seem to have a very significant joint impact on Croatian foreign exchange 
intervention. As suggested by Figure 7, a decline in the significance level is related to 
non-intervention periods. With likelihood measures being significantly higher for euro 
sales than euro purchases Figure 7 also provides evidence for “more decisive” interven-
tion in times of kuna depreciation than in times of kuna appreciation as discussed above. 
 
Summarizing we can conclude that although the determinants of Croatian foreign ex-
change intervention can not be identified without ambiguity, it seems that both the ex-
change rate level and exchange rate volatility matter for Croatian foreign exchange in-
tervention. What is particular for Croatia is the sensibility with respect to kuna deprecia-
tion due to the highly euroized financial sector and high foreign currency denominated 
debt. This finding seems to be consistent with the role of capital markets for foreign 
exchange intervention in emerging markets as put forward in section 2. This is even 
more plausible as the volatility of daily returns and the fluctuations exchange rate levels 
seem intertwined. 
                                                 
17   Small window sizes are more sensible to structural changes, while they tend to be more instable than 
large window sizes. The results of large window sizes are similar and can be supplied upon request. 
21
ECB




We have scrutinized the motivation for foreign exchange intervention in large countries 
with highly developed capital markets as well as in small countries with underdevel-
oped capital markets. Although official data on Croatian foreign exchange intervention 
are likely not to represent the full picture of intervention activities, the econometric re-
sults for Croatia widely confirm the notion that emerging markets with underdeveloped 
capital markets tend to heavily manage both day-to-day exchange rate volatilities as 
well as exchange rate levels. The pattern of foreign exchange intervention for Croatia 
confirms a fear of depreciation (with respect to balance sheet effects of the banking sec-
tor) more than a fear of appreciation (with respect to export competitiveness). 
 
The results for Japan are less robust. The asymmetric intervention pattern clearly con-
firms a fear of a high yen which can be attributed to concerns about the competitiveness 
of the export industry as well valuations losses of international dollar reserves. There is 
less econometric evidence that also exchange rate volatility matters. As exchange rate 
volatility has been consistently higher in Japan than in Croatia, the Japanese monetary 
authorities do not seem concerned about day-to-day volatility which is in line the highly 
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Table 2: Studies on Foreign Exchange Interven
















                            
















   





                                  











                



















Guimarães/Karacadag (2004)   
03/2001 - 10/2003               
 (foreign exchange auctions) 
Probit  
(purchas
















                                       
















                                          






















Akinci et al. (2005)
                     
05/2001 -
12/2003                         






                           


























08/1996 - 06/2003 
Probit  
(purchas





                
           


















                        











































Working Paper Series No 636
June 2006 
Table 3: Binary Probit Reaction Function for Jap
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Table 4: Tw
o Stage Least Squares Reac
tion Function for Japanese Foreign 
























































































Working Paper Series No 636
June 2006 
 
Table 5: Tobit Reaction Function for Japanes
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Table 6: Binary Probit Reaction Function for Cr
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Table 8: Tobit Reaction Function for Croatia
























































































































Working Paper Series No 636
June 2006 








Williamson and Miller (1987)        Krugman (1991) 

























intervention (right hand scale)
yen/dollar (left hand scale)
 





Working Paper Series No 636
June 2006 


















































































































new Taiwan dollar/dollar (01/01/99 = 100) 
35
ECB
Working Paper Series No 636
June 2006 










































euro transactions (left scale)
kuna/euro (right scale)




Working Paper Series No 636
June 2006 











































































































































































































































































































 is 1.65. 
37
ECB
Working Paper Series No 636
June 2006 
Figure 7: Rolling Probit Estimation LR-Statistics for Joint Significance of α1 and α2 Coeffi-
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Note: The critical value from a chi-squared distribution with two degrees of freedom is 5.99. 
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